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THE ROLE OF SHORT-TERMISM AND UNCERTAINTY IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
INACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: A MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK 
 
Abstract 
Despite increasing pressure to address climate change, firms have been slow to respond with 
effective action. This paper derives a multi-level framework for a better understanding of why 
many firms are failing to reduce their absolute greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to 
climate change. To explain the phenomenon of organizational inaction on climate change, we 
draw on the related concepts of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance from research in 
psychology, sociology and organization theory. We argue that antecedents related to short-
termism and uncertainty avoidance reinforce each other at three levels – individual, 
organizational and institutional – and result in organizational inaction on climate change. We 
discuss the implications of our framework for research on corporate sustainability. 
 
Key words: Climate change, corporate sustainability, short-termism, uncertainty avoidance, 
multi-level theory   
   3 
Managing corporate sustainability has gained momentum over the past decades, which 
has also led to a wealth of research by organization scholars. Relying primarily on the resource-
based view and institutional theory, corporate sustainability research has developed insights into 
the types of environmental business practices firms have adopted (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003), 
when the adoption of such practices creates an economic pay-off (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003), and which factors have pushed firms to engage in these 
practices (Bansal & Roth, 2000). Notwithstanding the important contributions of existing 
sustainability research, many of these studies assume that firms do indeed address sustainability 
issues, be it to gain a competitive advantage or to maintain legitimacy. What is lacking, however, 
is a deeper understanding of the reasons why many firms simply do not reduce their impact on 
the natural environment. To date, the corporate sustainability literature has not provided a clear 
conceptualization of firms’ inaction with regard to sustainability issues. 
To explore the phenomenon of organizational inaction on sustainability issues, we focus 
on climate change in this paper given the urgency of this issue for society. We define 
organizational inaction on climate change as the failure to reduce absolute greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions due to a lack of effective measures, where effectiveness refers to achieving 
durable emissions reductions in absolute terms. This definition highlights that inaction refers not 
only to the fact that firms fail to permanently reduce their absolute GHG emissions, but also that 
they do not take the necessary measures to achieve such reductions. In addition, we focus on 
absolute rather than relative emissions reductions to emphasize that economic growth without 
absolute reductions will continue to stress our ecosystems with adverse consequences for 
humanity (Rockström et al., 2009). 
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While the existing literature on corporate responses to climate change has examined a 
wide variety of measures that proactive firms take to reduce their GHG emissions (Hoffman, 
2005; Okereke & Russel, 2010; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009), recent data in industrial GHG emissions 
show that despite their stated efforts many firms have not reduced their overall emissions. For 
example, the fifty largest corporate emitters reporting to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
have increased their GHG emissions between 2009 and 2013 (CDP/PwC, 2013). 
Notwithstanding the importance of understanding the reasons why firms engage in proactive 
measures, this evidence suggests that the failure to take effective measures to permanently 
reduce absolute emissions is far more pervasive and warrants further investigation. It must be 
noted that inaction is not simply the opposite of action, however. There is an asymmetry between 
action and inaction in the sense that “[w]e are held responsible (or we hold ourselves 
responsible) for harms that we cause through action but not for harms that we fail to prevent” 
(Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002, p. 45). Hence, we posit that developing a deeper understanding of 
the reasons for organizational inaction on climate change offers a unique opportunity to explore 
new perspectives in corporate sustainability. 
Previous organizational and psychology research on climate change has pointed to the 
role of individual and organizational time perspectives in explaining inaction. However, despite a 
few exceptions (see Hoffman & Bazerman, 2007), such research lacks integration and tends to 
focus on one level only. Nevertheless, a broader perspective on climate change suggests that 
antecedents (e.g., individual attitudes, business practices, and government policies) that could 
explain inaction not only operate at different levels, but are also closely interconnected across 
levels (Hulme, 2009). Therefore, in this paper we develop a multi-level framework that draws on 
theories from a variety of disciplines, including psychology, sociology and organization theory. 
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Our framework highlights two mechanisms in particular – short-termism and uncertainty 
avoidance – that operate at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels as well as 
across these levels, resulting in persistent organizational inaction towards climate change.  
In developing our multilevel framework of organizational inaction to reduce GHGs, we 
contribute to organizational research on climate change and to corporate sustainability research 
in three ways. First, by focusing on inaction rather than on the different types of responses or 
strategies that firms take, our framework explains why many firms fail to respond to 
sustainability issues. Second, drawing on multiple theories, our multi-level framework of climate 
change inaction highlights the interaction between factors at different levels that impede action 
and thus achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the complex web of factors that hinder 
the action needed to reduce absolute GHG emissions. Finally, we discuss how the related 
concepts of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance operate at all three levels of analysis and 
integrate them into a multi-level theory of inaction. Temporal concepts have been given little 
attention in corporate sustainability research even though time is central in many 
conceptualizations of sustainable development (Gladwin, Kennelly, & Krause, 1995; Held, 
2001). 
CLIMATE CHANGE INACTION 
 
A growing body of research has emerged over the last decade that examines the various 
types of organizational responses to climate change (Hoffman, 2005; Kolk & Pinkse, 2005; 
Okereke, Wittneben, & Bowen, 2012; Sprengel & Busch, 2011). This research has argued that 
firms are increasingly responding to climate change by taking advantage of both the cost savings 
and GHG reductions from reducing their energy consumption (Pinkse & Kolk, 2009). 
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Accordingly, there is evidence that firms have developed business solutions to mitigate climate 
change such as investing in energy-efficiency technologies, renewable energy, and financial 
instruments to enable transactions in the carbon market (Hoffman, 2005; Okereke & Russel, 
2010; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009). However, according to the recent CDP findings mentioned earlier, 
many firms have not reduced their absolute GHG emissions. This means that despite increased 
attention to climate change, many firms have not taken sufficient measures to reduce their 
absolute GHG emissions.   
In light of all the managerial responses and mitigation options discussed in the literature 
and the general need to curb GHG emissions, a key question remains: why is it that many firms 
remain inactive and continue to increase their absolute GHG emissions? Given that corporate 
GHG emissions continue to rise, it is just as important to understand why firms do not act as it is 
to understand why they do. As Wade-Benzoni et al. (2002, p. 45) argue, inaction is a unique 
phenomenon because people have “the tendency to consider harmful acts to be worse than 
equally harmful omissions”; that is, individuals tend to attach a higher level of importance to 
harm caused by action than to harm from a failure to take action. While some research has 
examined barriers that may hinder firms from engaging in effective environmental management 
practices (Delmas, 2000; Hoffman & Bazerman, 2007; Tinsley & Pillai, 2006; Wackernagel & 
Rees, 1997) or carbon management practices specifically (Gillingham & Sweeney, 2012; 
Hoffman, 2010; Jeswani, Wehrmeyer, & Mulugetta, 2008; Okereke, 2007), this prior research 
tends to focus on the difficulty of implementing certain practices rather than on the phenomenon 
of inaction itself. Meanwhile, Hoffman & Bazerman (2007) point to cognitive barriers to action 
on sustainability, such as the mythical fixed pie bias in which individuals frame the relationship 
between sustainability and competitiveness as a win-lose and choose the latter over the former. 
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They also point to organizational barriers such as an overreliance on regulatory standards which 
leads to compliance rather than to effective solutions for sustainability challenges. This research, 
however, lacks an integrative multi-level approach to explaining inaction. Multi-level theorizing 
can provide important insights into complex phenomena such as sustainability (Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985). 
Overall, the extant literature has not given due attention to the concept of inaction. As 
presented above, we define organizational inaction on climate change as the failure to reduce 
absolute GHG emissions due to a lack of effective measures. This definition highlights two 
important conditions of inaction (see Table 1). The first condition is that firms fail to undertake 
purposeful and far-reaching measures to deal with climate change. When firms do not seek to 
reduce their GHG emissions through mitigation measures, but still inadvertently reduce their 
emissions, such reductions are not deliberate but rather the result of efficiency improvements or 
a decrease in production. As the reductions are not the outcome of deliberate measures, we still 
consider this to be inaction. The second condition is that firms do not achieve reductions in their 
absolute GHG emissions. A firm can be considered inactive when it seeks to reduce emissions 
but the measures undertaken only yield marginal improvements in carbon efficiency (e.g., 
measured by the GHG emissions per unit produced) instead of absolute emissions reductions. In 
such cases relative improvements are countered by overall increases in GHG emissions often due 
to increased production. Increasing carbon efficiency, therefore, is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for effective action on climate change (cf., Ehrenfeld & Hoffman, 2013). Tackling 
climate change requires absolute reductions in GHG emissions, which means that as a firm 
grows, its improvements in carbon efficiency must exceed the growth-related emissions increase. 
In other words, firms need to permanently reduce the additional emissions stemming from 
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growth. Given their high level of dependence on carbon-based resources, many organizations 
will require large transformational change which will take considerable time to take hold, if they 
are serious about climate change (Hoffmann & Busch, 2008; Unruh, 2000). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
         ------------------------------------------------ 
To better understand climate inaction, it is important to examine the challenges that are 
posed by the climate change issue. Climate change presents unique challenges for businesses and 
society given that its effects are both long-term and urgent in nature. On the one hand, the 
biggest impacts of climate change may be decades or more away; yet, there is limited time to 
find cost-effective ways to reduce GHG emissions (Keith, 2009; Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & 
Auld, 2012). Because GHGs stay in the atmosphere for a sustained period of time, the world may 
have already reached a tipping point after which physical impacts will be experienced on a 
massive scale (IPCC, 2007). In fact, in May 2013 the daily mean concentration of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere surpassed 400 parts per million for the first time in recorded human history, 
marking an important threshold recognized as a dangerous level for a changing climate and its 
impacts on humanity (Carrington, 2013). These developments emphasize the necessity to focus 
on GHG reductions in absolute and not in relative terms, as the latter can lead to increasing 
emissions overall. However, making investments now to cut total GHG emissions will only have 
delayed and uncertain benefits for society at some point in the future (Levin et al., 2012). In 
addition, the precautionary nature of climate change also creates mixed signals regarding the 
need for action (Hulme, 2009), because it asks for measures that may not have tangible benefits 
in the short run and only uncertain benefits in the long run (Levin et al., 2012). Hence, climate 
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change has been referred to as a predictable surprise: “an event or set of events that catch an 
organization off-guard, despite leaders’ prior awareness of all of the information necessary to 
anticipate the events and their consequences” (Bazerman, 2006, p. 180). Given the relevance of 
climate change’s temporal and uncertainty dimensions (Lazarus, 2009), we now turn to research 
on time and uncertainty for answers regarding the inaction of firms on this sustainability issue. 
 
A MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK OF INACTION 
For over a century, social scientists have examined the time perspectives of individuals 
and their behavioral consequences (Fraisse, 1963; Klineberg, 1968; Lewin, 1948; Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). A particular focus of this 
research has been on the tendency of individuals to favor the short term over the long term. 
While a number of reasons have been presented for this short-termism, one reason has received 
particular attention: uncertainty avoidance. Time and uncertainty are inextricably linked, for as 
Prelec and Lowenstein note “anything that is delayed is almost by definition uncertain” (1991, p. 
784). But while short-termism is often seen as a consequence of a time delay in expected impacts 
of decisions, uncertainty avoidance instead stresses the lack of information about the likelihood 
that expected impacts will materialize (Laverty, 1996; Marginson & McAulay, 2008; Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991).  
 Short-termism has been linked to poor sustainability outcomes at various levels of 
analysis. The link between shorter time perspectives and a lack of pro-social and pro-
environmental behaviors has been established at the individual level of analysis (Joireman, 
Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006; Strathman et al., 1994). In addition, research at the 
organizational level has pointed to a link between a short-term focus in organizations and a 
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limited response to environmental issues, including climate change (Slawinski & Bansal, 2012). 
However, there is no comprehensive multi-level theory of organizational inaction on climate 
change that brings together the antecedents at each level as well as interactions across levels (cf. 
Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Rousseau, 1985). 
To explain how short-termism and uncertainty avoidance prompt firms to avoid effective 
action on climate change through absolute reductions of GHG emissions, we present a multi-
level framework which emphasizes the cross-level and mixed-determinants nature of our 
phenomenon under study (Klein et al., 1994; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Rousseau, 1985). Taking 
a multi-level approach is especially important given the complexity associated with sustainability 
broadly, and climate change in particular (Hoffman & Bazerman, 2007). The framework 
explains organizational inaction on climate change through factors related to short-termism and 
uncertainty avoidance that operate at the individual, organizational, and institutional levels (see 
Figure 1). Our framework is cross-level because it involves “relationships between independent 
and dependent variables at different levels” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 20); yet, it is also a mixed-
determinants model since we highlight how explanatory variables at different levels affect an 
outcome variable at the organizational level (Klein et al., 1994; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). 
Drawing largely on the fields of psychology, sociology and organization theory, we theoretically 
explore how the mechanisms of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance operate at each of the 
three levels, how the levels interact and the boundary conditions under which these interactions 
between levels further reinforce inaction.  
----------------------------------------------- 




The Individual Level  
  
Various streams of research in psychology point to the tendency of individuals to focus 
on the short term at the expense of the long term and suggest a relationship between a short-term 
focus and a lack of attention to sustainability issues (Joireman et al., 2006; Strathman et al., 
1994). In addition, a focus on the short term is tightly linked to avoiding uncertainty and we 
argue that both these individual-level factors affect organizational decisions on climate change. 
While these factors will have a bearing on all managers in an organization, in our analysis we 
focus in particular on managers with a dedicated responsibility for addressing climate change. 
For instance, this role could vary from the Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) manager to 
the CEO.  
Research in psychology has shown that individual time perspectives affect decision-
making (Fraisse, 1963; Klineberg, 1968; Lewin, 1948; Strathman et al., 1994; Zimbardo & 
Boyd, 1999). Zimbardo and Boyd define time perspective as “the often nonconscious process 
whereby the continual flows of personal and social experiences are assigned to temporal 
categories, or time frames, that help to give order, coherence, and meaning to those events” 
(1999, p. 1271). Individuals use these temporal cognitive frames in forming expectations and 
goals and for making decisions.  
When it comes to making decisions that have a long-lasting environmental impact, 
individuals with a present-time perspective are less likely to take these impacts into 
consideration. The link between a present-time perspective and a lack of pro-social and pro-
environmental behavior has been demonstrated in a number of studies (Fraisse, 1963; Joireman, 
Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004; Klineberg, 1968; Lewin, 1948; Strathman et al., 1994; Zimbardo 
& Boyd, 1999). These studies show that because social and environmental outcomes tend to be 
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felt over time, they are not accorded much weight by present-oriented individuals. Accordingly, 
in the case of climate change, the benefits of effective action on climate change tend to be 
temporally distant and will therefore be assigned less urgency or importance by present-focused 
managers who are more likely to focus their attention on business issues that matter in the short 
run. 
Individuals with a present-time perspective are also more likely to possess high discount 
rates, meaning that they undervalue outcomes in the future (Laverty, 1996). In other words, 
present-focused individuals tend to underestimate future benefits while overestimating present 
costs, which can lead to economic short-termism whereby  “decisions and outcomes pursue a 
course of action that is best for the short term but suboptimal over the long run” (Laverty, 1996, 
p. 826). Overestimating present costs of mitigation will result in managers proposing fewer long-
term substantive initiatives that can decrease absolute emissions. Instead they are more likely to 
focus on initiatives that result in immediate pay-offs. 
Part of the reason individuals tend to possess high discount rates lies in the relationship 
between time and uncertainty (Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004; Wade-
Benzoni, 2008). The future is related to uncertainty because, as Augier and March (1995, p. 405) 
explain, “outcomes that are distant in time are systematically harder to predict than are outcomes 
that are near.” As such, when individuals make a decision regarding the future, such decisions 
also encompass uncertainty. Wade-Benzoni (2008, p. 225) argues that “because of the inherent 
uncertainty regarding whether an event will actually occur at a future point in time, people are 
tempted to neglect potential negative developments and put off ‘bad things’ with the hope that 
they will just go away.” This is especially the case for individuals who exhibit a low tolerance 
for uncertainty. When presented with an issue such as climate change, where information may be 
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limited or inconsistent, individuals will tend to avoid the issue (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 
1983; Dutton & Webster, 1988) and focus on information that is more certain. In addition, when 
people experience uncertainty in their jobs, they tend to focus on the short-term requirements of 
their job to regain control, even when this is detrimental to the long run (Marginson & McAulay, 
2008). Thus, short-termism and a low tolerance for uncertainty reinforce each other. In the case 
of climate change, if the managers who are responsible for addressing the issue possess a 
present-time perspective, they may ignore its long-term consequences, both because it is 
uncertain and because it is temporally distant. These managers will focus instead on the 
immediate needs of the firm, such as regulatory compliance, which presents them with more 
certainty. 
Given that the consequences of climate change are long-term and uncertain, and that 
effective climate change mitigation requires significant upfront investments, climate managers 
who are present-focused, and who have a low tolerance for uncertainty, are unlikely to advocate 
for significant organizational changes – e.g. to the strategy or the main business model – that 
could lead to absolute emissions reductions. Instead, present-oriented climate change managers 
are more inclined to seek incremental changes, or changes that lead to immediate results, while 
avoiding significant investments in climate change mitigation (Milfont, 2010; Wade-Benzoni, 
2008). While incremental changes might improve a firm’s carbon efficiency, they are unlikely to 
be sufficient to bring down absolute GHG emissions. Therefore, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 1: The greater the managers’ present-time perspective and the lower their 
tolerance for uncertainty, the more an organization will be disposed to inaction on 
climate change. 
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The Organizational Level  
Akin to the individual level, temporal factors also operate at the organizational level 
(Ancona, Okhuysen, & Perlow, 2001; Ashkanasy et al., 2004). There is a stream of literature that 
seeks to understand the causes and consequences of short-termism in organizations, arguing that 
many firms routinely undervalue the future in favor of making short-term profits (Laverty, 1996; 
Marginson & McAulay, 2008). Organizational factors such as standard management practices 
are critical in explaining firms’ short-termism. Researchers have argued that practices such as 
investment appraisals based on discounted cash flow analysis and short-term performance 
management result in the immediate future being weighted heavily compared to the distant 
future (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). Others have pointed to reward and incentive systems that 
create short-term biases and direct managerial attention to immediate personal goals (Hoffman & 
Bazerman, 2007). While the use of such management practices is standard in most firms, they 
may become a source of inaction when they start to dominate organizational decision-making on 
sustainability issues that clearly have non-financial aspects as well. For example, using 
discounted cash flow analysis to evaluate investments in climate change mitigation may lead to 
decisions that favor short-term financial returns over long-term emissions reductions. Similarly, 
incentive systems that reward short-term cost savings may contribute to a preference to invest in 
climate change initiatives that will save the firm money in the short term, but will only have 
limited impact on reducing absolute GHG emissions. The more capital-intensive investments 
required to achieve absolute reductions would be perceived to be detrimental to achieving short-
term performance objectives, and therefore seen as undesirable. 
In addition, management practices that encourage short-termism also serve to reduce 
uncertainty in firms, which may explain why they are preferred to other practices that encourage 
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firms to make decisions that lead to reductions in absolute GHG emissions. Many firms exhibit a 
preference for tangible results over uncertain benefits and as such tend to focus on the more 
obvious win-win solutions that address both financial and environmental goals simultaneously, 
such as energy efficiency and waste management. However, win-win solutions might preclude 
taking more effective action on climate change, such as significant investments in emissions 
reduction technologies, that have no immediate financial benefits to the organization (Hahn, 
Figge, Pinkse, & Preuss, 2010). It should be noted that some firms choose to balance quantitative 
investment appraisals and planning, such as discounted cash flow analysis, with more qualitative 
approaches such as scenario analysis which explores different possible futures (Marcus, 2009). 
The majority of firms, however, gravitate toward quantitative measures because these measures 
appear to reduce uncertainty by making investment decisions and variables more tangible. For 
instance, Slawinski and Bansal (2012) found that firms that relied primarily on quantitative 
approaches to decision-making on climate change focused singularly on the cost of carbon rather 
than on various dimensions of the issue. This limited perspective prevented them from taking 
effective action on climate change mitigation. At the same time, these firms also tended to be 
less tolerant of uncertainty. Because climate change was seen as an uncertain issue, firms that 
were less tolerant of uncertainty avoided making significant investments in climate change 
mitigation. Consequently, when organizational decisions regarding climate change mitigation are 
made using investment appraisal practices, firms are likely to favor the short-term financial 
benefits and will ignore the long-term impacts of climate change. 
To summarize, firms that rely heavily on the use of management practices that emphasize 
short-term financial returns in their decision-making on climate change will be less likely to 
make significant investments that would contribute to absolute GHG emissions reductions, 
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especially in light of the uncertainty associated with such investments and their long-term pay-
off periods. Thus, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 2: The more an organization uses standard management practices for 
climate change decision-making, the more it will be disposed to inaction on climate 
change.  
 
The Institutional Level 
 
The two mechanisms that we distinguish as main sources of climate change inaction – 
short-termism and uncertainty avoidance – also operate at the institutional level. In this section, 
we examine how institutional logics, combined with regulatory uncertainty, lead to an 
institutional environment that encourages organizational inaction on climate change. Institutions 
and their underlying logics are relevant in explaining corporate approaches to climate change 
(Ansari, Wijen, & Gray, 2013; Hoffman, 2011), including inaction, given that “the interests, 
identities, values, and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded within 
prevailing institutional logics” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012, p. 6). Accordingly, the 
climate change debate is profoundly ideological exposing deep faultlines between actors 
embedded in fundamentally different institutional logics (Hoffman, 2011; Wade-Benzoni et al., 
2002).  
On the one hand, scholars have asserted that climate change is governed by a 
transnational commons logic, which states that the global climate is a common resource, and 
everyone has a shared responsibility to ensure its biophysical functions are not put at risk (Ansari 
et al., 2013). On the other hand, climate change has been approached through a market logic 
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(Thornton, 2002; Thornton et al., 2012), which in its purest form states that climate change 
mitigation should not occur at the expense of economic growth (Hoffman, 2011), because this 
logic “prizes growth in share price, wealth accumulation, keen competition, and committing 
investment capital” (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011, p. 4). Climate change mitigation 
should therefore not only contribute to the reduction of GHG emissions, but also to firms’ 
growth objectives, wealth accumulation and strategic position in the market (Bumpus & 
Liverman, 2008; Hoffman, 2005).   
The dominance of the market logic in the global economy has contributed to an 
institutional environment that encourages organizational inaction in various ways. First, the 
market logic has been used to oppose action on climate change, based on the assumption that it 
will hinder economic growth (Ansari et al., 2013; Hoffman, 2011). As climate change is closely 
connected to the functioning of a fossil-fuel-based economy (Hoffman, 2011), proponents of 
drastic action to reduce GHG emissions are seen to be challenging the main sources of economic 
growth and putting at risk the capacity of firms to create profits and shareholder value. Second, 
in a less extreme incarnation, the market logic would not lead to a full opposition of climate 
change mitigation, but at least to pressures that GHG reduction measures should also contribute 
to shareholder value (Bumpus & Liverman, 2008). As such, the market logic would not 
automatically lead to short-termism, because shareholder value should also reflect a firm’s long-
term value. Nonetheless, since the share price forms the main source of legitimacy in a market 
logic (Thornton et al., 2012), there will be a bias toward maximizing the current share price. 
Only when investors have a strong belief in the potential of low-carbon investments to be a main 
driver of economic growth will organizational measures to reduce GHG emissions translate into 
a higher share price. As argued above, uncertainty about the future payback of such investments 
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will thus mean that the current dominance of the market logic will create short-termism in firms 
and a bias towards taking marginal emissions reduction measures.    
Third, the market logic fuels organizational inaction because it forms the foundation of 
the main regulatory institution to curb GHG emissions – the carbon market – which leads climate 
policy to be ingrained with a short-term focus (Newell & Paterson, 2010). Pinkse and Kolk 
(2007) found, for example, that the European Union emissions trading scheme is temporally 
incompatible with long-term investments required for large fossil-fuel-based installations 
because relatively short trading periods have lead firms to avoid strategic investment decisions 
with amortization periods of several decades. Moreover, firms are not necessarily using the 
carbon market to achieve absolute GHG emissions reductions, but instead to generate short-term 
profits (Newell & Paterson, 2010). While traditional environmental standards might encourage 
firms to aim for compliance instead of environmental impact reduction (Tenbrunsel, Wade-
Benzoni, Messick, & Bazerman, 2000), the carbon market goes one step further in pushing firms 
to focus on the short term even more strongly as it can be used for financial speculation (Newell 
& Paterson, 2010).  
The dominance of the market logic is further bolstered by another institutional-level 
variable – regulatory uncertainty (Marcus, Aragon-Correa, & Pinkse, 2011) – defined as an 
actor’s perceived inability to predict the future state of the regulatory environment (Hoffmann, 
Trautmann, & Hamprecht, 2009). Research shows that to avoid regulatory uncertainty, firms 
may postpone large capital investments pending more certainty about future regulations 
(Hoffmann et al., 2009). Hence, regulatory uncertainty also leads firms to focus on the short 
term; that is, firms avoid significant investments in climate change mitigation when future 
regulations are unclear given they cannot predict whether they will receive a payback on their 
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investment (Hoffmann, 2007). In recent years, regulatory uncertainty on climate change has 
grown stronger. Not only has the Kyoto Protocol been weakened at the end of its first 
commitment period in 2012 with Canada, Japan and Russia refusing to take on further emission 
reductions targets, but the global policymaking process around a follow-up protocol has also 
stalled considerably (Banerjee, 2012). As a consequence, in many jurisdictions, the nature and 
form of future climate policy instruments has not been decided and remains uncertain. So while 
the most dominant form of climate policy, a carbon market, would already lead firms to take 
marginal measures with a singular focus on improving carbon efficiency, regulatory uncertainty 
acts as a further deterrent to action.     
All things considered, then, the market logic will either lead firms not to act at all, as 
climate change mitigation could be seen to be in conflict with economic growth, or it might push 
firms to take incremental measures that either create immediate financial payoffs or that result in 
compliance. Moreover, the market logic as a source of inaction will be even stronger if firms 
face regulatory uncertainty. Hence, we propose: 
 
Proposition 3: The more climate policy is dominated by the market logic and the higher 
the regulatory uncertainty, the more an organization will be disposed to inaction on 
climate change. 
 
The Vicious Circle of Organizational Inaction  
In this section, we propose that the mechanisms of short-termism and uncertainty 
avoidance interact and reinforce each other across levels, thus creating a vicious circle of 
inaction. For example, managers’ present-time perspectives and low tolerance for uncertainty 
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can shape and are shaped by short-term organizational practices such as financial investment 
appraisal tools and managerial rewards systems that favor the near term over the long term. 
Likewise, there is an interaction between organizational practices and the institutional logics and 
regulatory uncertainty that reside at the institutional level. Finally, individual managers can also 
affect the institutional environment, but at the same time behave according to taken-for-granted 
patterns that have come to be institutionalized. In the following, we explore the conditions under 
which such interactions between levels are likely to be stronger and thus reinforce the vicious 
circle of inaction. 
Individual and organizational level interactions.  Organizations research has pointed to a 
relationship between individual-level and organizational-level time constructs (Bluedorn, 2002; 
Laverty, 1996; Marginson & McAulay, 2008). Das (1987) found, for example, that individuals’ 
time perspectives were linked to their preference for short- and long-term planning, which in turn 
shaped organizational level planning. Specifically managers with present-time perspectives 
exhibited a preference for short-term planning, which in turn shortened the time horizons of 
planning practices in organizations. In addition, research has shown that the short-term 
preferences of managers affect the time preferences of others in their group (Marginson & 
McAulay, 2008). Social contagion can occur across levels as individual members influence 
others, eventually shaping organizational level practices, processes and routines (Aguilera, Rupp, 
Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). Hence, managers’ short-term 
preferences and low tolerance for uncertainty may not only affect their own position on the issue 
of climate change but may also shape management practices, such that inaction on climate 
change becomes institutionalized within their organization. 
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In turn, an organization’s approach to time, as reflected in standard management practices 
such as capital budgeting and rewards and incentive systems, may shape the time perspectives of 
managers and can thus determine their preferred response to climate change. Although time 
perspectives are a relatively stable individual attribute, they are also situationally determined 
(Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). People develop a cognitive temporal bias and become predominantly 
past, present or future-oriented but their time perspective may also shift over time depending on 
learned factors such as culture and education. Over time, managers may be influenced by their 
organization’s time perspective, which is reflected in the firm’s management practices (Schein, 
1992). As such, short-term practices like capital budgeting and annual bonus systems may shape 
managers’ approaches to time (Laverty, 1996). Hence, management practices that emphasize the 
short term and aim to reduce uncertainty alter the time preferences of managers and could at the 
same time influence their attitude towards climate change. To summarize, present-focused 
managers who have a low tolerance for uncertainty and short-term oriented management 
practices that favor certainty in decision-making on climate change will lead to a vicious circle. 
We therefore posit:   
 
Proposition 4a: A manager’s present-time perspective and an organization’s use of 
standard management practices for climate change decision-making mutually interact 
to reinforce organizational inaction on climate change.  
 
The strength of the relationship between the time perspective of the climate change 
manager and the management practices used for decision-making on climate change will be 
influenced by the climate manager’s position within the organization. Organizations tend to be 
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reflections of their top managers’ values and cognitions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), which 
implies that managers in more senior positions will have a stronger influence on management 
practices than employees in a lower hierarchical position within the organization. We therefore 
expect that when managers responsible for decision-making on climate change are in a more 
senior position, the likelihood of inaction will be higher, because their time perspective will have 
a more profound impact on the management practices used for decision-making on climate 
change. While it has been shown that senior management involvement is an important 
determinant of pro-active environmental strategies (Bansal & Roth, 2000), we argue that their 
stronger relative influence on management practices also works in the opposite direction. When 
managers with a strong present-time perspective are in a more senior position, they will be able 
to shape short-term oriented management practices, thus hampering concrete action to reduce 
absolute GHG emissions. As we argued with proposition 4a, the dynamics at the individual and 
organizational levels  reinforce each other and this, in turn, will affect how a firm addresses 
climate change. This interaction effect will be stronger when the manager responsible for climate 
change is in a more senior position. As such, we expect the following: 
 
Proposition 4b: The more senior the position of a manager responsible for decision-
making on climate change, the stronger will be the interaction between the manager’s 
present-time perspective and an organization’s use of standard management practices, 
which further reinforces organizational inaction on climate change. 
 
Organizational and institutional level interactions. Regarding the interaction between the 
organizational and institutional levels, we argue that the dominance of the market logic and 
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regulatory uncertainty both prompt firms to keep using standard management practices for 
climate decision-making, even if this does not lead to effective action that reduces absolute GHG 
emissions. The market logic has a strong influence on firms in pushing them to use standard 
management practices for decision-making on all kinds of issues, not just those with a clear 
financial dimension. The main attributes of the market logic, that firm objectives should be 
aimed at shareholder value and the management of competition (Miller et al., 2011), have 
become widespread because they are considered to drive the efficient functioning of firms 
(Thornton, 2002). It is not surprising then that the use of short-term oriented management 
practices, such as investment appraisal and performance management, which are deeply 
embedded in the market logic, have also been advocated as a way to tackle sustainability issues 
(Porter & Kramer, 2006; Siegel, 2009), and climate change in particular (Porter & Reinhardt, 
2007).  
The rationale is that competitive forces and shareholder value creation would also 
stimulate firms to find the most efficient approach to reducing absolute GHG emissions. 
However, as discussed already, the short-termism that is inherent in the market logic makes firms 
focus their climate efforts on achieving quick financial benefits and tangible results to improve 
their competitive position (Hahn et al., 2010; Slawinski & Bansal, 2012). This implies that the 
use of standard management practices could lead firms to fail to reduce their absolute GHG 
emissions due to the tension between the investment horizon needed for climate change 
mitigation and the one imposed by the market logic.  
Regulatory uncertainty has also stimulated the use of management practices that prevent 
firms from acting on climate change. A major issue with regard to regulatory uncertainty is that 
government incentives have followed an erratic trend over the years in many countries. For 
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example, U.S. utilities’ investments in carbon capture and storage technologies stalled as a result 
of a change in government policies (Banerjee, 2012). Hence, even when firms realize the 
relevance of adjusting their investment practices to account for uncertainty and to focus more on 
the long term, regulatory uncertainty will prevent them from doing so, as they risk betting on a 
policy framework that will not persist (Rugman & Verbeke, 1998). It should be noted, however, 
that firms have also contributed to regulatory uncertainty themselves. While firms have 
emphasized on many occasions that they favor more regulatory certainty, at the same time they 
have exerted considerable influence on climate policy in an attempt to water down more 
stringent norms. Based on the argument that climate policy should not challenge economic value 
creation and employment, corporate lobbying has been a barrier against the implementation of 
more ambitious regulations (Ansari et al., 2013; Kolk & Pinkse, 2007).  
Given the dominance of the market logic and regulatory uncertainty in climate change 
decision-making, the probability that firms will change management practices to lengthen their 
time horizon and tolerate a higher level of uncertainty for climate-related investment projects 
will remain low. A transformational change in management practices would require firms to 
openly challenge the market logic by embracing long-term thinking in core business practices 
along with a more caring attitude toward the natural environment (Hoffman, 2011; Hoffman & 
Bazerman, 2007). Hence, we propose: 
 
Proposition 5a: An organization’s use of standard management practices for climate 
change decision-making and the market logic mutually interact to reinforce 
organizational inaction on climate change.  
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Not all firms will be affected equally by the market logic, however. An important 
condition for the extent to which firms are held prisoner by the market logic and tend to be 
paralyzed by regulatory uncertainty is their position in the organizational field and the maturity 
of the field (Fligstein, 1997). Firms with a central position in their field tend to fare well by the 
use of established management practices, and thus have a vested interest to maintain the existing 
order of the field (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). Such powerful 
incumbent firms have an incentive to advocate a further reproduction of such practices as it 
strengthens their legitimacy and position in the organizational field (Fligstein, 1997; Maguire, 
Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004). Through a constant reproduction of standard management practices, 
incumbent firms create a high degree of taken-for-grantedness of the practices and further 
reinforce the market logic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When firms operate on the periphery of 
the field, though, their interest to stick to established management practices is much lower, 
because they have less to gain from the existing order (Rao et al., 2000).  
In addition, in more mature organizational fields, established management practices tend 
to be more stable. As Maguire and colleagues (2004, p. 659) argue, “[m]ature fields represent 
relatively well-structured configurations of actors that are aware of their involvement in a 
common enterprise and among which there are identifiable patterns of interaction such as 
domination, subordination, conflict, and cooperation.” For firms in a mature field, the potential 
to break free from the dominant logic and change standard management practices will be far 
more challenging, compared to firms that operate in an emerging field where such practices have 
not yet reached the same state of taken-for-grantedness (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Maguire et 
al., 2004). Taken together, both these conditions – position in the field and maturity of the field – 
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will influence how the interaction between organizational and institutional-level factors affects 
organizational inaction on climate change. Thus, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 5b: The more central the position of an organization in the organizational 
field and the more mature the field, the stronger will be the interaction between an 
organization’s use of standard management practices and the market logic, which 
further reinforces organizational inaction on climate change. 
 
Individual and institutional level interactions. A further reinforcement of the vicious circle 
can be found in the interaction between the individual and institutional levels. A key assumption 
of institutional logics is that individuals shape and are shaped by institutions (Thornton et al., 
2012). That is, individuals’ temporal cognitive frames are a result of their embeddedness in the 
market logic, which ensures that a present-time perspective and low tolerance for uncertainty are 
taken for granted cognitively (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Consequently, managers responsible 
for climate change will not be inclined to question the short-termism that dominates their 
decision-making process, because it is seen as the proper way to behave in a business context. 
Moreover, when they continue to behave according to this dominant logic, they will even further 
reinforce the taken-for-grantedness of the behavior that forms the foundation of the market logic. 
In the institutional literature, this has been referred to as the paradox of embedded agency, which 
questions to what extent it would be possible for individuals to change institutions that govern 
their behavior (Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002).  
The market logic creates a top-down effect that managers will only pay attention to issues 
that fit this logic (Thornton et al., 2012). The market logic’s preoccupation with the share price 
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and competition puts the climate change issue outside the scope of managers as having relevance 
to core business practices because the potential impact is not concrete and is surrounded by too 
much uncertainty. Besides such a top-down effect, there is a bottom-up effect because when 
acting as industry lobbyists in the climate policymaking process, present-focused managers can 
contribute to short-termism and regulatory uncertainty at the institutional level. Industry 
lobbyists have played a critical role in pushing for market-based mechanisms, such as cap-and-
trade, as the main way to regulate GHG emissions (Grubb, Vrolijk, & Brack, 1999; Kolk & 
Pinkse, 2007) and have been pivotal in integrating a market logic into the global climate regime 
(Ansari et al., 2013). Moreover, at the UNFCCC climate conferences, more than 4200 industry 
lobbyists aggressively opposed any mandatory limits on emissions (Banerjee, 2012), and thus 
contributed to prolonging regulatory uncertainty. Hence, we propose: 
 
Proposition 6a: A manager’s present-time perspective and the market logic mutually 
interact to reinforce organizational inaction on climate change.  
 
While we argue that the dominance of the market logic and the present-focused cognitive 
frame of managers strongly interact in contributing to organizational inaction on climate change, 
an important condition for the strength of this interaction is the specific personal background of 
the manager who is responsible for climate change in an organization. As long as managers are 
not exposed to other institutional logics that would question the market logic (Thornton et al., 
2012), it will indeed be very difficult for them to break free from a present-time perspective and 
become more tolerant towards uncertainty. Managers who have built up a career within the same 
firm over a fairly long period of time or who have always worked in the same kind of functional 
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area or industry are likely to be fully immersed in the dominant logic. However, depending on 
the functional diversity and experience across countries or industries in their career backgrounds 
(Gupta, 1984), managers might also have been confronted with different, contradictory logics as 
well (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Purdy & Gray, 2009). It is not uncommon for sustainability 
managers to have a background in sectors, such as the public sector or NGOs, that are not 
governed by the market logic of prioritizing economic growth to the same degree. Relatedly, 
Levy and Kolk (2002) found that board members of US-based oil firms with more international 
experience were more sensitive to more ambitious European perspectives on climate change 
mitigation. Whether managers are shaped by the market logic thus depends on the diversity of 
their career background. Managers with a diverse career background have access to alternative 
sources of knowledge and perspectives on climate change, which leads to exposure to alternative 
logics (Thornton et al., 2012). Hence, the manager’s specific career background will influence 
the interaction between individual and institutional-level factors in contributing to organizational 
inaction on climate change. Thus, we posit the following:  
 
Proposition 6b: The less diverse is a manager’s career background, the stronger will be 
the interaction between a manager’s present-time perspective and the market logic, 
which further reinforces organizational inaction on climate change. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Management researchers have drawn largely upon organizational theories, such as the 
resource-based view and institutional theory, to explain firm responses to climate change (Pinkse 
& Kolk, 2009). However, these theories do not adequately explain the apparent inaction of firms 
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towards addressing climate change. In order to better understand the sources of prevailing 
inaction, we developed a multi-level framework that examines individual, organizational, and 
institutional antecedents. In developing our model we drew on theories of time and uncertainty in 
the psychology, sociology and organization theory literatures. We proposed that sources of 
organizational inaction related to short-termism and uncertainty avoidance exist at each of these 
levels and that they interact and reinforce each other across levels. In addition, we identified 
boundary conditions that strengthen the inaction that arises from each interaction. When the 
climate manager is in a senior role and has a less diverse career background, and when the firm 
has a central position in a mature field, inaction will be heightened in firms. 
Contributions 
Our model makes several contributions to the corporate sustainability literature. First, our 
model takes a different approach from much of the existing corporate sustainability research in 
that it explores the antecedents of inaction rather than focusing on the types of responses and the 
motivations behind firms’ actions (cf. Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). Previous research has focused 
mainly on how firms respond to sustainability issues highlighting differences such as between 
proactive and reactive approaches (Roome, 1992; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). However, even 
if some firms are proactive and are reducing their absolute GHG emissions, there are numerous 
firms that are not, and thus continue to contribute to an increase in global GHG emissions and to 
potentially dangerous changes to the climate. By focusing on inaction in the context of climate 
change, we gain insight into the lack of action being taken by firms on one of the most important 
and urgent issues facing society. Thus, our research calls for a redirection of the current debate 
towards understanding sources of inaction on a variety of sustainability issues in order to move 
sustainability research in new and promising directions. For example, a focus on inaction 
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highlights the importance of addressing limits to growth in research on sustainability. Research 
on proactive strategies often sidesteps the need to show results in the form of effective outcomes 
(e.g., absolute emissions reductions) and focuses instead on more positive-sounding relative 
measurements (e.g., reducing emissions intensity). Such a focus takes attention away from the 
fundamental issue that as firms continue to grow, so too will their emissions, despite proactive 
investments in climate change mitigation. 
Second, current theorizing only provides fragmented explanations of why climate change 
is not sufficiently addressed by business organizations. Our multi-level framework offers a more 
comprehensive set of antecedents to inaction by drawing on theories from various disciplines at 
different levels of analysis. Given the complexity associated with climate change, a multi-level 
approach provides a more integrated framework for explaining organizational inaction. As our 
propositions suggest, inaction on the organizational level is not only the result of factors that 
reside at individual, organizational, and institutional levels, but also of cross-level interactions 
between these factors. With our multi-level approach we also show how different theoretical 
perspectives can inform each other in explaining a complex sustainability issue such as climate 
change. Consistent with recent work on institutional logics (Thornton et al., 2012), our 
framework highlights that organizations’ failure to change is a result of a persistence of 
institutionalized practices that are co-determined by cognitive factors at the individual level and 
logics at the institutional level. Overcoming inaction therefore involves much more than 
changing these practices on an organizational level alone; it also requires breaking the complex 
web of taken-for-granted behaviors at all levels (Holm, 1995). 
Finally, we draw out the importance of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance across 
different levels. Research on time perspectives has been located primarily within the psychology 
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literature, yet has much to offer corporate sustainability research given that practicing 
sustainability requires a longer-term perspective (Gladwin et al., 1995; Held, 2001). While some 
temporal research does exist at the organizational level, few studies have examined the role of 
time in sustainability (for an exception, see Slawinski & Bansal, 2012). Furthermore, we showed 
how short-termism and uncertainty avoidance operate at different levels of analysis and how 
these levels interact to create a vicious circle that reinforces inaction on climate change. In so 
doing, we heed the call for a better understanding of the sources of short-termism at various 
levels of analysis (Laverty, 1996). Ultimately, by linking time and sustainability, we develop a 
new theoretical approach that holds promise for pushing corporate sustainability research in new 
and promising directions.  
Limitations and directions for future research 
There are limitations in our theoretical model that present opportunities for future 
research. First, although our model considers the related concepts of short-termism and 
uncertainty avoidance as interdependent mechanisms that operate at three levels of analysis, 
there are likely other factors that contribute to climate inaction at each level. Further theoretical 
development may therefore seek to extend our model. While we focused mostly on temporal 
aspects, the literatures we drew on contain many other potential factors that could contribute to 
improving our understanding of climate inaction (Hoffman & Bazerman, 2007; Milfont, 2010).  
Second, while we have focused on explaining the vicious circle of inaction, future 
research could seek to identify ways to get out of the vicious circle. We believe that the 
mechanisms of short-termism and uncertainty avoidance that we focus on in this paper may also 
contain the seed for an organizational turnaround on climate change. That is, the interdependence 
between these mechanisms at, and across, levels also means that changes that lengthen the time 
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horizon and reduce uncertainty avoidance at any one level may serve to change the antecedents 
at the other levels, thus prompting more climate change action among individuals, organizations 
and governments. For example, greater regulatory certainty would allow firms to lengthen their 
planning horizons when it comes to investing in climate change mitigation. Conversely, firms 
with practices that encourage longer time horizons such as scenario planning might lobby 
governments for more stringent policies which could create regulatory certainty (Slawinski & 
Bansal, 2012). Firms have increasingly reached out to governments, international agencies, and 
NGOs by engaging in multi-stakeholder partnerships on climate change (Pinkse & Kolk, 2012). 
Such stakeholder engagement practices have the potential to extend the time horizons of firms 
and managers, as they cooperate with more long-term oriented actors. Further research is 
necessary, however, to investigate whether there are also virtuous interactions between these 
mechanisms.   
Third, our multi-level framework focused only on the issue of climate change. 
Notwithstanding the importance of this global issue, this raises the question of whether our 
multilevel framework is also relevant to other sustainability issues. We believe the temporal 
dimension is pertinent for other issues as well (Gladwin et al., 1995; Held, 2001), including 
biodiversity or the nitrogen cycle (Rockström et al., 2009), because these have similar temporal 
dynamics reinforcing each other at different levels. When looking at the public debate, however, 
these issues do not appear as urgent as climate change, yet. Hence, understanding why 
businesses fail to act on climate change is critical for understanding the failure to act on other 
sustainability issues as well (Whiteman, Walker, & Perego, 2013; Winn & Pogutz, 2013). 
Finally, while multi-level theorizing allows researchers to address complex organizational 
phenomena, it is not without its challenges. Multi-level frameworks normally cross disciplinary 
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lines with differences in jargon and competing theoretical frameworks (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000).  To overcome this barrier we drew on similar concepts – short-termism and uncertainty 
avoidance – within these disparate literatures.  Future research could test our propositions to 
ensure that our model is robust. Such empirical research could include testing the relationship 
between managers’ time perspectives and their propensity to act on climate change. Other tests 
could include the relationship between specific management practices and inaction within 
organizations as well as the relationship between regulatory uncertainty and inaction.  
Implications for managers and policy makers 
Our research contains a number of implications for both managers and policy makers. 
Our model suggests that when managers approach sustainability issues with a present-time lens 
and a low tolerance for uncertainty, they not only fail to understand the future implications of 
such issues on the firm and the business environment, but they are also less likely to act, which 
can have negative consequences both for the firm and for society. Thus, managers need to be 
aware of their time perspective and tolerance for uncertainty and be cognizant that particular 
management practices encourage short-termism while discouraging action on sustainability 
issues. Organizations can introduce practices that encourage longer-term horizons, such as 
scenario planning or long-term incentive schemes for managers.   
With regard to public policy makers, one may argue that current regulations are too weak, 
unreliable, and short-term oriented, and therefore have not led to marked improvements among 
firms in terms of absolute GHG emission reductions. Instead, regulations need to be more 
stringent and stable over time, while allowing firms the flexibility to incorporate climate change 
into their strategy. In addition, regulations should encourage firms to take a longer-term 
perspective in addressing the climate change issue. As such, more stability and consistency of 
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institutional arrangements may provide the certainty needed for firms to make more significant 
investments in climate change mitigation.  
Concluding remarks  
Climate change is an urgent problem that requires organizations, civil society and 
governments to find long-term solutions. With the absence of strong measures by governments, 
and the lack of power of civil society organizations, firms are increasingly being called on to 
provide solutions to the sustainability challenges to which they have contributed (Hoffman & 
Bazerman, 2007). Although sustainability scholars have pointed out that a growing number of 
firms are taking a proactive stance on climate change (Hoffman, 2005; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009), the 
numbers tell a different story – absolute GHG emissions are growing among many firms 
(CDP/PwC, 2013). Our multi-level approach highlights the inherent complexity and 
interrelationships that create a vicious circle of inaction. If firms are to achieve meaningful 
absolute GHG reductions, then we need to understand how managers, organizational practices 
and the institutional environment interact. We suggest that extending time horizons at all three 
levels and embracing the uncertainty inherent in confronting climate change shows promise for 
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Table 1:  Organizational inaction on climate change explained 
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Figure 1: A multi-level model of organizational inaction on climate change 
 
 
